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ROGER G. NOLL*
I. INTRODUCTION
Gillian Hadfield's article describes how legal services do not
provide cost-effective solutions to an increasing proportion of the
legal problems that high-tech corporate clients face. The essence of
Professor Hadfield's argument is that accelerated technological
progress and globalization of economic relationships have made
standard-form solutions to legal problems increasingly inefficient, and
that the legal profession has been slow to adapt its services to these
changed circumstances.'
According to Professor Hadfield, the failure of legal services to
adapt to changing customer demands has two causes: a "near
monopoly" of the public sector in producing legal rules, and self-
regulation of entry and practice in the legal profession. Professor
Hadfield's "near monopoly" in public law is not really a monopoly
because it is the product of many independent actors, some of whom
actively compete with each other. Instead, the near monopoly is a
manifestation of self-regulation. Her near monopoly refers to limits on
the extent to which private parties can escape the precedents, rules
and procedures of public legal institutions in forging business
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Professor Hadfield also agrees with the older argument that restricting non-lawyers from
providing simple legal services causes fees for these services to be too high and, in so doing,
inefficiently limits access to these services. I do not discuss this argument here. For an
analysis of this issue that supports Professor Hadfield's analysis, see generally CLIFFORD
WINSTON ET AL., FIRST THING WE Do, LET'S DEREGULATE ALL THE LAWYERS (2011).
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relationships and, especially, resolving disputes arising from these
relationships.
The other undesirable effect of self-regulation is determining the
skills and modes of thought that must be acquired to become a lawyer
through accrediting law schools and designing bar exams. The
ossification of legal practice that is the theme of Professor Hadfield's
article arises from two characteristics of legal education: an
orientation towards effective advocacy and an emphasis on basing
analysis on parallels with precedent. These features of legal education
create a backwards-looking focus on winning disputes rather than a
forward-looking focus on innovative solutions to new problems.
Regulation-substantially influenced, if not controlled, by national
and state bar associations-specifies the services that only lawyers are
allowed to provide and the organizations through which lawyers can
supply these services. Professor Hadfield's critique of these
restrictions is not just that only lawyers are allowed to provide a
variety of legal services that others could do as well at lower cost. The
novel part of her critique is that the separation of the legal profession
from other areas of expertise (engineering, finance, etc.) inhibits
multidisciplinary approaches to solving new problems that arise in
contemporary business relationships. Whereas experts in other fields
may be involved as consultants, they must act in a subsidiary role
because regulation restricts the practice of law and the employment
relationship between lawyers and non-lawyers.
Professor Hadfield's conclusion is that if clients could opt out of
these rules, innovation would lead to improvements in the cost-
effectiveness of legal services. She bases this conclusion on the
observations that technological progress and globalization have
caused the obsolescence of many pro forma approaches to solving
legal problems, and that people other than American-trained lawyers
have knowledge and skills that are relevant to solving these problems.
In brief, if smart, appropriately-trained people are thrown at problems
arising in contemporary business relationships, good things will
happen.
My comment focuses on this last step of Professor Hadfield's
argument. Because innovation is impossible to predict, expecting
Professor Hadfield to specify the types of innovations that will arise
from a more flexible system for supplying legal services clearly is
asking too much. Nevertheless, the assumption that innovation will
follow if impediments to more flexible methods of supplying legal
services are removed could be an example of "technological
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optimism"-the belief that innovation can be relied upon to overcome
any significant impediment to continued economic growth.2
To address the plausibility of innovative solutions to new legal
problems, I identify impediments to innovation in legal services, other
than legal rules and institutions, and examine the likelihood that they
could be overcome if the obstacles discussed by Professor Hadfield
were removed. Whereas there is no obstacle that definitively cannot
be overcome, the problematic issues are whether the current state of
knowledge can support innovations in legal services and whether new
organizations are likely to emerge that can effectively deliver the
multidisciplinary services Professor Hadfield envisions.
II. CONDITIONS FAVORABLE TO INNOVATION
Research on the innovative process has identified four necessary
conditions for successful innovation.3 The first is the presence of
market demand that provides the financial incentive for innovation.
The other three conditions relate to the supply side of the innovation
process: appropriability, knowledge base, and organizational
readiness.
Professor Hadfield's argument that legal services are both too
expensive and ill-suited to solve contemporary legal problems is about
the demand for legal services among corporate clients. Technological
optimism consists of believing that the presence of demand normally
is sufficient for innovation to occur. Innovators will respond to
demand by figuring out a way to profit from satisfying it, overcoming
the other conditions for innovation and creating whatever new
knowledge and organizational arrangements are necessary to solve the
problem.
A. APPROPRIABILITY
Appropriability refers to the extent to which an innovator can keep
the social benefits of innovation. Innovation inevitably requires a sunk
investment in producing new knowledge that makes a new product or
production process feasible. A profit-oriented innovator must be able
2 James E. Krier & Clayton P. Gillette, The Un-Easy Case for Technological Optimism, 84
MICH. L. REV. 405, 407-09 (1985).
3 For a summary of these factors, see David J. Teece, Profiting from Technological
Innovation Implications for Integration, Collaboration, Licensing and Public Policy, 15
REs. POL'Y 285, 285-88 (1986).
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to sustain a price for the product in excess of its long-run average cost
for a long enough period to recoup this sunk investment. Thus,
successful innovation requires that the innovator be sufficiently
protected from competition to make innovation financially attractive.
The problem facing an entrepreneur who seeks to profit from new
knowledge is that the act of using this information to produce a
product runs the risk of enabling others to acquire this knowledge and
use it to produce a competitive product without compensating the
innovator. If copying an innovation is easy and inexpensive,
innovation has low appropriability and a profit-seeking entrepreneur
will not innovate.
The difficulty of copying an innovation differs substantially among
products. For example, the formula for Coca-Cola was invented in
1886,4 but still has not been successfully copied, while generic copies
of brand-name pharmaceuticals are common and account for a large
majority of drug sales.5
For innovations that otherwise could be profitably copied,
appropriability can be increased by intellectual property rights, but
again the extent to which intellectual property rights protect an
innovation against competition varies substantially among products. 6
For example, pharmaceutical patents are very strong for three
reasons.7 First, even if a variant of a patented chemical would be as
effective in treating the same medical condition, "inventing around" a
drug is expensive and time-consuming due to the requirements for
obtaining approval of a new drug by the Food and Drug
4 For the history of Coca Cola, see The Coca-Cola Company Heritage Timeline: 1886-
1892, THE COCA-COLA COMPANY, http://heritage.coca-cola.com (last visited Feb. 17, 2012).
5 About GPhA: Facts at a Glance, GENERIC PHARMACEUTICAL ASSOCIATION,
http://www.gphaonline.org/about-gpha/about-generics/facts (last visited Feb. 17, 2012).
Nearly eighty percent of all brand-name pharmaceuticals face generic competition, and
generics account for nearly seventy percent of all prescriptions; however, as an indication
of the significance of competition for appropriability, generics account for only about
sixteen percent of total revenues from drug sales.
6 For an examination of differences in appropriability and the importance of intellectual
property rights among industries, see Richard Levin et al., Appropriating the Returns
from Industrial Research and Development, 19 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. AcIVITY
783, 783-88 (1987).
7 For a thorough analysis of impediments to competition in drugs, see generally C. Scott
Hemphill, Paying for Delay: Pharmaceutical Patent Settlement as a Regulatory Design
Problem, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1553, 1563-67 (2006).
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Administration (FDA). 8 Second, even if the patent for an approved
new drug is so weak that a non-infringing generic copy is likely to be
feasible, regulatory rules regarding challenges to drug patents
virtually guarantee that generic entry cannot occur for at least six and
a half years after the original drug is approved.9 Third,
pharmaceuticals almost always have an economic life-that is, a
period when the product can be profitably sold-that exceeds the
duration of patent protection (twenty years plus an adjustment for
delay in obtaining FDA approval). Many innovations have much
shorter economic lives due to rapid obsolescence. Examples of the
latter are patented software and, especially, the vast majority of
copyrighted cultural works. Popular cultural products typically are
withdrawn from the market within a few years after their creation. As
a result, the duration of copyright protection vastly exceeds the
economic life of most works.o
One issue with respect to innovation in legal services is the extent
to which creative solutions to new legal problems are appropriable. At
first blush, the prospects seem dim because the essence of creative
solutions to legal problems is not likely to be eligible for either a
patent or copyright. But the same can be said for traditional legal
services, and highly skilled lawyers remain highly rewarded for their
practice. The reason, apparently, is that the crucial input to the
production of legal services is highly-skilled lawyers, and highly-
skilled lawyers apparently constitute a small fraction of all graduates
of law school. The same circumstance arises in other professions that
require substantial training and in which earnings vary substantially
among practitioners with essentially the same formal credentials, such
as architects, financial analysts, software creators, management
consultants and surgeons.
8 Id. at 1564-67.
9 Id. at 1564-1610. Depending on the nature of the patent for a brand-name drug, a generic
manufacturer must wait either four or five years before filing an application with the FDA
to market a generic drug. If the brand-name firm then files an infringement suit against the
generic applicant, the generic drug cannot enter until the infringement suit is litigated to
conclusion or thirty months expire, whichever is sooner. Because infringement litigation
rarely can be concluded within thirty months, the generic entry rules almost always give a
brand-name firm at least six and a half years of protection against entry by generics that do
not infringe the patent.
10 For an example of the tenuous connection between the economic life of copyrighted
works and the duration of copyright protection, see Linda R. Cohen & Roger G. Noll,
Intellectual Property, Antitrust and the New Economy, 62 U. PITr. L. REV. 453, 471
(2001).
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The financial rewards to the best practitioners in skilled
professions do not arise from market power, which is the result of
intellectual property rights in unique and highly-valued innovative
products. The seven-figure incomes of top lawyers, consultants, movie
stars and professional athletes do not arise from monopoly power, but
from scarcity in highly-skilled professions. Formal barriers to entry
into the legal profession probably do cause higher earnings among
"ordinary" lawyers because people other than those who attend law
school could perform these services and would be willing to do so at a
lesser wage. But the best lawyers do not have close substitutes, not
even among other lawyers. As a result, an increase in the demand for
the most demanding legal services leads primarily to an increase in
price, not an increase in supply.
If restrictions on the practice of law were removed, and as a result
new multidisciplinary professional services firms emerged that could
offer better solutions to contemporary legal problems in the new
globalized economy, the nature of their innovation does not seem
likely to be a product easily copied by a large number of people.
Instead, these innovative, new providers of legal services will develop
and apply a new set of skills that are beyond the reach of most
professionals and hence will be richly rewarded.
The other appropriability issue applies to the problem of
collaboration among firms, supported by legal agreements, to produce
an innovation. The question here is whether an agreement can be
created that provides adequate protection against opportunistic
behavior by one of the collaborators. This issue is at the heart of the
organizational readiness condition for innovation, and so will be
discussed in that section.
B. KNOWLEDGE BASE
In order for innovation to occur, relevant knowledge must be
available to permit a successful attack on the problems that must be
solved to produce the new product. The knowledge base consists of
the information and know-how that is available for creating
innovations.,, The concept of knowledge base is broader than just
technical information and analytic methods. Innovation differs from
invention (creating the first prototype) because innovation involves
creating the production and distribution system that supports success
1 For more details about the concept of knowledge base, see Franco Malerba, Sectoral
Systems ofInnovation: A Framework for Linking Innovation to the Knowledge Base,
Structure and Dynamics of Sectors, 14 ECON. INNov. NEW TECHN. 63, 66-70 (2005).
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in the market.12 For example, an essential element of Henry Ford's
innovation in automobiles was replacing a handicraft production
process with an assembly line.13
The innovation that Professor Hadfield envisions for legal services
is the product of multidisciplinary teams (lawyers, engineers,
economists and other professionals) that understand the underlying
technology and business environment of the firm and will use that
information to craft more effective solutions to legal problems. The
team need not invent new products and production technology,
methods of financial analysis or other new knowledge. Instead, the
team must combine these knowledge bases to enable two
organizations to undertake another innovation (the product that
emanates from their collaboration). The unstated core assumption is
that one who fully understands the technology, business environment
and relevant law has a sufficient knowledge base to create innovative
legal services.
Professor Hadfield's presumption obviously is not universally
applicable to all multidisciplinary problems. Producing genetically-
engineered products requires more than a team of chemists, biologists
and engineers. Such a combination was necessary to make tomatoes
with built-in pest resistance, but both the invention and the
innovation required the creation of a broader knowledge base and
depended on the feasibility of creating a biologically-viable, pest-
resistant tomato.
Most likely, a group of talented people with different but relevant
skills are likely to come up with better solutions to the legal problems
that are faced by globalized firms in the new economy. But the
marriage of these skills into new legal products may not be an easy
task, and the resulting products, while better, still may fall short of the
desires of the business executives that Professor Hadfield interviewed.
The underlying question is whether relationships among
organizations in the globalized new economy can ever be solved
without merging the organizations and substituting internal
governance for inter-organizational agreements, which brings us to
the final condition for innovation.
12 VernonW. Ruttan, Usher and Schumpeter on Invention, Innovation and Technological
Change, 73 Q. J. EcoN. 596, 597-98 (1959).
1 CHRIS FREEMAN & Luc SOETE, THE ECONOMICS OF INDUSTRIAL INNOVATION 141-43 (3d
ed. 1997).
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C. ORGANIZATIONAL READINESS
Oliver Williamson won the Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences for
his path-breaking work on the properties of different ways to manage
cooperative economic activities.14 His insight was that certain kinds of
economic relationships are better managed within the same
organization than through contracts between separate organizations.
Among the reasons why integration can work better than
collaboration across organizations are that integration to some degree
harmonizes incentives of different production units and that internal
rules can be more effective than contracts in protecting against
opportunistic behavior if uncertainty makes complete contracts
unlikely.
Inter-organizational, collaborative innovation is especially prone
to problems of incomplete contracting because uncertainty is a
defining characteristic of the innovative process. Moreover, the
appropriability issue makes opportunistic behavior especially likely in
innovative collaboration. Because not all possible outcomes of
collaborative innovation can be foreseen, not all opportunistic
behavior can be anticipated and protected against in a collaboration
agreement.
A simple example illustrates the problem. Suppose two firms each
possess secret information that, when combined, can be used to create
a highly profitable innovation. To negotiate a collaboration
agreement, each firm must reveal enough of its secret information so
that its prospective partner recognizes the value of collaboration, but
in so doing each firm may create an opportunity for its potential
partner simply to steal its secret, rather than collaborate and share the
reward.15
Professor Hadfield has posed an interesting question in
organizational design. The underlying problem is whether research
collaboration or vertical contracting for innovative inputs (that is, one
firm contracts with another to perform research and development
14 See generally OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND
ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS: A STUDY IN THE ECONOMICS OF INTERNAL ORGANIZATION (1975).
'5 See Jack Hirshleifer, The Private and Social Value of Information and the Reward to
Inventive Activity, 61 AM. ECON. REV. 561, 566-68 (1971). Each firm can protect against
such opportunism by buying the stock of the other, or shorting the stock of the other firm's
competitors; however, this strategy works only if a firm has access to enough financial
capital to engage in the necessary transactions and if the amount of stock that must be
transacted to compensate the firm for the loss of its secret is small enough that the
transaction does not substantially affect the prices of the transacted stocks.
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[R&D] to support some element of its new product or production
process) is feasible, given the possibility for opportunistic behavior.
Collaborative research creates a relation-specific asset, that is, an
asset that has value only when used in collaboration with the other
party. If contracts are incomplete or imperfectly enforced, one partner
may attempt to hold up the other by failing to uphold the agreement
(at least in spirit) for the purpose of increasing its share of the rewards
from collaboration, especially if one firm's assets are more closely tied
to the collaboration than the assets of the other firm.16 This
fundamental contracting problem has led most economists to
conclude that R&D leading to product innovation is difficult to
accomplish through contracts. Instead, it is better undertaken within
the same firm (a hierarchy) in which innovators need not fear that the
production and distribution components, or even a complementary
R&D component, will steal their ideas or otherwise take opportunistic
advantage of them.
The complaints of high-tech CEOs that are reported by Professor
Hadfield are consistent with this traditional problem of using markets
to produce innovations among collaborating firms with independent
and, to some degree, conflicting objectives. The implication of the
extensive research on the boundaries of the firm, beginning with
Coase's seminal paper,'7 is that firms generally will prefer to integrate
into R&D rather than to contract for it with other firms. The exception
is firms that undertake R&D to invent products, obtain enforceable
intellectual property rights, and then license or sell those rights to
other firms that will take responsibility for product innovation
(bringing the invention to the market).
Professor Hadfield is correct that, in recent years, high-tech firms
have been more prone to engage in collaborative R&D than in the
past, perhaps as a result of the strengthening of patent rights over the
last two decades. But the conclusion that the mismatch between legal
services and the legal services requirements to make innovation
collaboration successful can be cured by removing some of the
restrictions on legal practice is only one possibility. The other
possibility is that innovation in legal services cannot overcome the
inherent tendency for opportunistic behavior in these relationships, in
which case the cure for these complaints is either a merger or a joint
venture.
16 See Benjamin Klein et al., Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive
Contracting Process, 21 J. L. & ECON. 297, 300-01 (1978).
17 See R. H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 390-92 (1937).
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A similar organizational issue arises in forecasting the likely
outcome if restrictions on legal practice are removed. At present, the
only alternatives to the multidisciplinary legal services practices
envisioned by Professor Hadfield are contractual relationships
(between law firms and other types of consultants or between clients
and both law firms and consulting firms) or vertical integration by the
client (whereby the general counsel's office employs people from other
disciplines and is managed by a person who is experienced in the
business, rather than a lawyer). The former is likely to be susceptible
to opportunistic behavior arising from the difficulty that a client
would have in assigning responsibility for under-performance, and the
latter is poorly suited for capturing economies of scale arising from
intermittency in the need for these types of legal services. These
arguments support Professor Hadfield's view that restrictions on legal
practice are potentially important because removing them would
provide a solution to both the contracting problem and the scale
economies problem.
III. CONCLUSION
I am grateful to Professor Hadfield for writing such a thought-
provoking paper. Her article raises important new questions about
facilitating technical progress among innovative firms in a globalized
economy. Everything she says about the potential costs of self-
regulation of the practice of law is well reasoned and compelling. The
only loose end is whether a multidisciplinary team of smart people can
solve the problems that she identifies. Surely they should be given the
chance, and in some cases-circumstances in which opportunistic
behavior is unlikely or can be circumvented by contract-they are
likely to succeed. But one should not be surprised if, a decade after the
reform, Silicon Valley CEOs still complain about the quality of legal
services when in fact the problem is trying to solve an impossible
contracting problem.
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